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Abstract 
In cognitive linguistics, metonymy is seen as a fundamental cognitive process where one conceptual 
entity affords access to another closely associated one. Cases of vertical polysemy have also often 
been treated as instances of metonymy (see e.g. Radden and Kövecses, 1999). In vertical polysemy a 
lexical form designates two or more senses that are in a relationship of categorial inclusion – e.g. dog 
‘canine’, ‘male canine’. 
 In this paper I present an account of cases of vertical polysemy from the point of view of 
domain-based encyclopaedic semantics as described in Langacker (1987). I claim that the domain 
configurations which underlie the broader and narrower meanings of vertical polysemes are very 
different from those involved in cases of metonymy. Croft (1993) argues that from a Langackerian 
viewpoint, metonymy involves a shift in the salience of two domains that form parts of a domain 
matrix against which a given concept is profiled. In cases of vertical polysemy, on the other hand, the 
relationship between the broader and narrower meanings may be effected in a number of different 
ways, none of which involve the kind of domain configurations found in metonymy. For example, the 
narrower ‘male canine’ sense of dog makes reference to an additional domain of SEX, a domain which 
is not an essential part of the domain structure of the broader ‘canine’ meaning. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In cognitive linguistics, metonymy is seen as a fundamental cognitive process that has 
a key role in human conceptualisation, and thus the study of metonymy forms a key 
area of research. Frequently, the phenomenon of vertical polysemy is also treated as 
essentially metonymic – as arising through a metonymic process or involving a 
metonymic mapping. In vertical polysemy, a word form designates two (or more) 
distinct senses that are in a relationship of categorial inclusion or hyponymy.  
 This paper first overviews some of the issues concerning the relationship of 
vertical polysemy and metonymy. Concurring with Seto (1999, 2003), I maintain that 
treating vertical polysemy as metonymic relies on a metaphorical conception of 
categories and often effectively involves a confusion of taxonomic relations with 
meronomic part-whole relations.  
 I go on to show that there is a crucial difference between the conceptual 
configurations involved in vertical polysemy and metonymy by adopting an 
encyclopaedic, domain-based view of semantic structure as described by Langacker 
(1987). In Langacker’s model of encyclopaedic semantics, each linguistic form acts as 
a point of access to an open-ended network of knowledge, which is structured in 
terms of conceptual domains. Domains provide a background against which the 
concepts that lexical forms designate are understood. Thus a meaning symbolised by a 
linguistic form is profiled against a base, which includes specifications in one or 
more domains necessarily presupposed by the profile (Langacker, 1987; Taylor, 
2002). Since in most cases the meaning of a lexical form does contain specifications 
from multiple domains, the domains presupposed by a concept collectively form a 
domain matrix.  
 Within a domain-based view of meaning, metonymy involves a highlighting 
of one domain that forms a part of the domain matrix of the concept profile in 
question, and the backgrounding of another (Croft, 1993). Vertical polysemy, on the 
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other hand, does not involve a shift in the salience of domains. Instead, I argue that 
there are a number of ways in which the narrower meaning of a vertical polyseme 
may be related to the broader one in terms of its domain structure. For example, the 
narrower ‘male canine’ reading of dog makes reference to an additional domain of 
SEX, a domain that is not an essential part of the domain structure of the broader 
‘canine’ meaning. In other cases the broader and narrower meanings of vertical 
polysemes are profiled against different domains one of which is an instance of the 
other, or the narrower meaning profiles more specific properties in the same 
domain(s) as those presupposed by the broader meaning.  
 Highlighting the fundamental difference between the domain structures 
involved in metonymy and vertical polysemy helps to delineate the phenomenon of 
metonymy and thus contribute to its study as a cognitive process.  
 
 
2. Vertical polysemy and metonymy 
As mentioned, the phenomenon I here refer to as vertical polysemy involves cases 
where a word form designates two (or sometimes more) categories that are in a 
relationship of categorial inclusion or hyponymy. Such a word is therefore 
polysemous with a broader and a narrower sense that occupy different levels in a 
taxonomic† hierarchy. In taxonomic diagrams, inclusion relationships are commonly 
depicted on the vertical axis, which is what motivates the term vertical polysemy. The 
same phenomenon is often referred to as autohyponymy (Horn, 1984), alluding to the 
fact that a vertically polysemous word is effectively its own hyponym.‡ A well-known 
example of vertical polysemy is dog which, in addition to meaning ‘canine’, also has 
a more specific ‘male canine’ sense that contrasts with bitch. Other oft-mentioned 
cases are drink with its meanings ‘consume liquid’ and ‘consume alcohol’ and finger, 
whose meaning can either include or exclude thumbs. Yet further examples include 
cup (whose meaning can either include or contrast with that of mug); love (‘strong 
affection’, ‘strong romantic affection’) and salad (‘green salad’, ‘a us. chilled dish of 
vegetables or other ingredients, such as potato salad’). In all of these cases a single 
lexical form designates both a broader and a narrower category in a way that creates 
the potential for ambiguity, although in some cases the vertically related senses may 
be more distinct than in others (see e.g. Tuggy, 1993, Geeraerts, 1993 and Cruse, 
2000a, 2002b and Croft and Cruse, 2004 for discussion of the idea of ambiguity-
vagueness continuum).  
 In many accounts vertical polysemy (or the categorial transfer to a broader or 
narrower category that results in vertical polysemy) is considered essentially as a type 
of metonymy. The study of metonymy has its roots in traditional studies of literary 
                                                 
† Note that I use taxonomic throughout in a general sense to mean any kind of category inclusion 
relationship. In principle, however, taxonomic inclusion may be distinguished from functional 
inclusion, such as the relationship between pet and dog, which is not logically necessary (dogs may be 
used as pets, but not all dogs are necessarily pets) – see Wierzbicka (1984) and Murphy (2003) for 
further discussion of taxonymic and functional inclusion relations. Taxonomic relations should not be 
confused with taxonymic relations, which are a more specific subtype of inclusion relations, as 
discussed by Cruse (e.g. 2002a). I argue elsewhere (Koskela, in prep.) that vertical polysemes may 
involve either meanings related by taxonymy or simpler, non-taxonymic inclusion.  
‡ Cruse (2000b) distinguishes between autohyponymy and autohyperonymy, delimiting the former to 
cases where the vertical polysemy emerges through the narrowing of sense and the latter to instances 
where it results from broadening. As Horn’s (1984) use of autohyponymy covers both cases of 
broadening and narrowing, this means that the term autohyponymy is itself vertically polysemous! This 
is one of the reasons why the term vertical polysemy is preferred here instead of autohyponymy. 
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rhetoric, where it was treated as an important type of figure of speech. In contrast, 
cognitive linguistic treatments of metonymy stress the inherently conceptual nature of 
metonymy by viewing it as a cognitive process which has a role in structuring the 
human conceptualisation of experience. In both the traditional and cognitive views 
metonymy is generally seen as involving some kind of stand-for relationship between 
contiguous entities. Thus typical examples of metonymy include cases like I drank 
the whole bottle, where the container (BOTTLE) stands for its contents (the liquid in the 
bottle) – a container and its contents being contiguous or closely associated. In 
cognitive linguistic work, the contiguous entities in question are seen as conceptual 
elements that form parts of some coherent conceptual complex and are associated 
with each other within that complex. According to Lakoff and Turner (1989), 
metonymy involves a conceptual mapping that links two entities within a single 
idealised cognitive model in a stand-for relationship. Radden and Kövecses (1999: 21) 
likewise see metonymy as involving conceptual entities within a single idealised 
cognitive model, although they do not view it as involving a mapping as such (for 
further discussion of different views of the role of mappings in metonymy see, for 
example, Barcelona, 2000). A somewhat different characterisation of metonymy is 
provided by Croft (1993), who adopts Langacker’s (1987) encyclopaedic, domain-
based view of semantic structures. While in Lakoff and Turner’s (and others’) view, 
metonymy crucially operates within a single conceptual model,§ Croft argues that 
metonymy operates between two conceptual domains that are part of the same domain 
matrix against which a given concept is profiled. What metonymy typically involves 
is a shift in the salience of two domains within the domain matrix. For example, in I 
got the students to read Wierzbicka for the next seminar, the name of the author 
metonymically stands for her works. The domain structure for Wierzbicka the person 
includes a domain characterising her as a human being as well as a domain against 
which our knowledge that she is an academic linguist who writes articles and books is 
profiled, as Figure 1 shows. The metonymy operates by backgrounding the domain of 
HUMAN BEING and highlighting the domain of ACADEMIC WRITING.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: A simplified domain structure of the concept WIERZBICKA, showing the metonymic 
highlighting of one domain (ACADEMIC WRITING) and the backgrounding of another (HUMAN BEING) 
within the domain matrix presupposed by the concept profile. 
As Croft (1993) points out, the difference between the two views of metonymy, the 
“single cognitive model” and the “two domains within a domain matrix” views, is not 
as great as it may seem. The key point in both characterisations is that metonymy 
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conceptual metaphor theory is seen as involving a mapping between two conceptual models. 
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involves a transfer of reference between elements within the same conceptual 
complex whose unity and coherence is motivated by human experience.  
 Given this characterisation of metonymy, we may now consider the 
relationship between vertical polysemy and metonymy – particularly the crucial 
differences between the two phenomena but also some of the reasons why vertical 
polysemy has nevertheless been often seen as a type of metonymy.  
 
2.1.Vertical polysemy as metonymic 
There are various reasons to believe that the view that vertical polysemy is a type of 
metonymy is misguided and that to do so obscures the complexity of the relationship 
between the broader and narrower senses in vertical polysemy. One of the problems 
with treating vertical polysemy as metonymic is that such a notion relies on a 
metaphorical conception of categories and contiguity relations, as Seto (1999; 2003) 
points out. Another, related problem, also noted by Seto, is that subsuming vertical 
polysemy under metonymy effectively confuses taxonomic relations with meronomic 
(or partonomic) part-whole relations.  
 Kövecses and Radden (1998), for example, assert that vertical polysemy is 
motivated by two general metonymies. They argue that narrowing of meaning is 
based on the metonymy A CATEGORY FOR A MEMBER OF THE CATEGORY and 
broadening on the metonymy A MEMBER OF A CATEGORY FOR THE CATEGORY.** This 
view relies on seeing the relationship that holds between vertically related categories 
(or categories and their members) as a type of stand-for relationship between 
contiguous entities. Kövecses and Radden note that in folk understanding categories 
are either understood metaphorically in terms of containers (see Lakoff, 1987) or in 
terms of part-whole relations. In the former conception, the relationship between 
vertically related categories is seen metaphorically in terms of a CONTAINER-
CONTENTS metonymy, similar to the use of bottle in I drank the whole bottle. The 
latter conception of categories means that a category is conceived metaphorically as a 
whole with its members constituting the parts that make up the category. Seto (2003), 
however, argues that although the metaphorical understanding of categories (and 
taxonomies) in terms of containers or part-whole relations is very appropriate and 
useful for a folk understanding of the nature of categories, it is harmful for a 
theoretical treatment of metonymy. In fact, he compares this confusion with the effect 
that the conduit metaphor (Reddy, 1993 [1979]) has had on our understanding of the 
nature of communication. As Seto (1999) notes, there is a crucial difference between 
metonymy and category extension in that metonymy operates between two real world 
entities (as conceived by us) while shift in denotation between more inclusive and 
more narrowly defined categories operates between conceptual categories. That is to 
say, metonymy relies on a “spatio-temporal contiguity as conceived by the speaker 
between an entity and another in the (real) world” (ibid.:91), while categorial transfer, 
which gives rise to vertical polysemy, relies on a relationship between conceptual 
                                                 
** Note that Kövecses and Radden speak in terms of a relationship between a category and its member, 
rather than a broader and a narrower category. The two conceptions are equivalent to the extent that we 
view the “category member” in Kövecses and Radden’s description as a category of entities that 
constitutes a member class within some broader class. Consider, for example, the example Kövecses 
and Radden give of broadening: aspirin being used for any pain-relieving tablet. The broadening of 
reference isn’t from a single token aspirin tablet as a member of the category of painkillers. Instead, it 
is from the category of aspirin painkillers to the category of painkillers in general, of which the class of 
aspirin tablets is of course a member. Similarly, in cases of narrowing the restriction of reference is to a 
smaller class (not to a token member of that class). 
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categories – not between entities in the (real) world.†† Although the contiguity 
between vertically related categories can be conceived metaphorically in terms of 
containers and their contents or wholes and their parts, the “contiguity” of vertically 
related conceptual categories is not the same as the contiguity of entities (relative to 
experiential domains in our conceptualisation).‡‡  
 Another important distinction between vertical polysemy and metonymy is 
that while the former involves a taxonomic relation between concepts, the latter 
instead involves a meronomic conceptual configuration. The idea that metonymy 
involves a part-whole relationship between conceptual elements forms part of various 
accounts of metonymy. Kövecses and Radden (1998) and Radden and Kövecses 
(1999), for example, argue that metonymies either involve two parts of the same 
cognitive model, or a whole cognitive model and its parts. Thus the metonymic 
relationship between a place and an institution, such as a factory and its workers 
(consider e.g. The factory went out on strike), involves two parts of the cognitive 
model characterising the concept FACTORY. On the other hand, the use of the name for 
the material of which something consists for that thing itself (e.g. wood, glass) 
involves a metonymic relationship between a part and the whole of the concept. Ruiz 
de Mendoza Ibáñez (2000), on the other hand, argues that metonymic mappings only 
occur between a whole domain and its part or vice versa, not between parts of a 
conceptual domain. Conversely, as discussed earlier, in the domain-based view 
metonymy operates typically between domains that form part of a domain matrix 
presupposed by a concept. In all accounts, however, the conceptual structures 
involved in metonymy are viewed as involving some kind of meronomic 
configuration.  
 In contrast, as I argue in the following, vertical polysemes involve two (or 
more) taxonomically related meanings, and consequently they do not involve the 
kinds of meronomic structures we find in metonymies. In the following I characterise 
the conceptual structures of vertical polysemes in the Langackerian domain-based 
view of semantic structures and I show that there are a number of different ways in 
which a taxonomic relation between word senses may be effected, but they do not 
involve the kinds of shifts in the salience of domains we find in metonymies. For 
example, the broader and narrower meanings of vertical polysemes may be profiled 
against different domains one of which is an instance of the other, or the narrower 
sense may make reference to an additional domain that is not an essential part of the 
domain structure of the broader meaning.  
 
 
3. Encyclopaedic semantics and conceptual domains 
As mentioned, Langackerian domain-based encyclopaedic semantics characterises the 
meanings of lexical forms in terms of profile-base organisation, where the base is the 
conceptual material presupposed by the concept in question. The base may invoke 
reference to a number of conceptual domains, which are coherent conceptual 
configurations grounded in human experience. For example, as Langacker (1987:185) 
                                                 
†† Compare Nerlich (in press, cited in Nerlich and Clarke, 1999), who also argues that metonymy relies 
on our knowledge of the world while categorial transfer is based on our knowledge of categories and 
the way they are ordered in the mind. 
‡‡ It is worth noting that in a later paper Radden and Kövecses (1999) do acknowledge that the 
confusion of taxonomy and meronomy that results from their analysis is not entirely desirable, but they 
nevertheless “feel justified” (ibid.:34) in analysing the relationships between broader and narrower 
categories as instances of metonymy. 
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discusses, the concept of UNCLE is profiled against a base of a kinship network given 
that to understand what (or who) an uncle is, we need to make reference to the idea of 
family relationships. The base invokes domains such as GENDER, MATING, BIRTH, 
PARENT/CHILD RELATIONSHIP and SIBLING RELATIONS. Certain domains may 
themselves presuppose other domains – e.g. the domain BIRTH presupposes the 
domain of REPRODUCTION. Some domains, such as SPACE or TOUCH however, are 
irreducible to any other domains, as they are grounded in our direct pre-conceptual 
experience and physiological and neurochemical properties as human beings.  
 In an encyclopaedic view of word meaning, any aspect of knowledge we 
associate with a particular word form may in principle form part of the meaning of 
that word. But not all knowledge is of equal importance, and the domains 
presupposed by a concept vary in how central or primary they are for the 
understanding of the concept. For example, the concept of CIRCLE is primarily profiled 
against the domain of TWO-DIMENSIONAL SPACE, but the full semantic structure of 
CIRCLE would also include any other aspects of encyclopaedic knowledge we may 
associate with the concept of CIRCLE even marginally and the domains presupposed by 
them. Thus we may associate with circles the fact that you can draw one using a pair 
of compasses, which would presuppose a domain such as GEOMETRIC DRAWING, but 
this domain would be a lot less central for the characterisation of CIRCLE than 2-D 
SPACE. But for reasons of space, the examples below do not include discussion of the 
non-central domains and specifications, something that would be required for a 
complete semantic analysis of any linguistic form. 
 
3.1. Domain structures and vertical polysemy 
As discussed above, the relationship that holds between vertically related meanings of 
a lexical form is one of taxonomic inclusion. It is notable that, in the literature on 
encyclopaedic semantics, taxonomically related concepts have not been treated in 
depth, although general issues relating to their possible treatment have been brought 
up. Hierarchical inclusion relations between linguistic units do form a central notion 
in Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar, where they are termed schema-instance 
relations. With respect to schema-instance relations between semantic units, 
Langacker (1987:378) notes that a semantic unit that is subordinate to another 
provides some additional information to the knowledge structure that it shares with its 
superordinate. For example, the concept PALM as a subordinate of TREE includes an 
additional specification of tropical settings. This encompasses the traditional idea that 
a hyponymous concept includes the semantic specifications of its superordinate plus 
some additional information. As for the domain structures of taxonomically related 
meanings, Croft (1993) remarks that the relationship between a profile and a base is 
not a taxonomic one; the concept CAT, for example, is not profiled against the domain 
of ANIMAL. Instead, Croft argues, a more general concept is itself profiled against the 
same domain as its hyponym. However, as discussed below, this is not always 
necessarily the case. Finally, Clausner and Croft (1999) point out that domains 
themselves can enter into taxonomic relations. Thus the domains EAT and DRINK are 
instances of a more general domain CONSUME.  
 Apart from these general points pertaining to taxonomically related concepts 
in domain-based encyclopaedic semantics, a detailed analysis of the domain structure 
of super- and subordinate semantic categories has not been provided. The nearest to 
this is Croft’s (1993) discussion of the meaning of fill up. He notes that this phrasal 
verb can be used more generally to mean ‘make something full’ as well as in a more 
specific meaning ‘make the fuel tank of a vehicle full of fuel’ – thus the expression 
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has two taxonomically related meanings. Croft argues that the two meanings are 
profiled in different domains,§§ but the narrower meaning is profiled against a domain 
that presupposes a domain against which the broader meaning is profiled. The details 
of this case are discussed further in the next section, in which I also examine other 
cases of vertical polysemy. I argue that taxonomically related meanings of a single 
lexical form may be related by various configurations of domains and profiling. At 
least four different configurations can be identified:*** 
 
1. The broader and narrower meanings are profiled against different domains, but 
the domain of the narrower meaning presupposes the domain of the broader 
meaning. Croft’s example fill up illustrates this type. 
2. The broader and narrower meanings are profiled against different domains, but 
the domain of the narrower meaning is an instance of the domain of the 
broader meaning. Love, ‘neutral’, ‘romantic’ is such a case. 
3. The broader and narrower meanings presuppose the same domains but the 
narrower meaning includes a core specification in an additional domain. An 
example of this type is dog, ‘canine’, ‘male canine’. 
4. The broader and narrower meanings presuppose the same domains, but profile 
different areas of the same domain(s), areas in a relationship of inclusion. 
Examples of this type include finger (including/excluding thumb) and cup 
(including/excluding mug).  
 
In all of these cases, the narrower meaning has richer semantic specifications, either 
by including reference to an additional or richer domain or by profiling more specific 
properties. But none of them involve the kind of domain configuration we find in 
cases of metonymy proper, such as CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS or PRODUCER FOR 
PRODUCED. Metonymies, as discussed, involve a shift in prominence between 
domains that are part of the conceptual structure presupposed by the profile. In 
contrast, when vertical polysemy arises through narrowing, the hyponymous sense 
gains additional, richer specifications than the broader, hyperonymous meaning. 
Conversely, in cases of broadening, some specifications are lost from the conceptual 
profile. The following section I present examples of each of these four types of 
domain configurations in vertical polysemes.  
 
3.2. Profiling in different domains, one presupposing another 
As mentioned, Croft (1993) discusses the vertically related meanings of fill up, ‘make 
something full’ and ‘make the fuel tank of a vehicle full of fuel’. According to Croft, 
the two meanings are profiled in different domains: the more general meaning is 
profiled against the domain matrix of SUBSTANCES AND CONTAINERS, which itself 
presupposes the domain of SHAPE. The narrower meaning, on the other hand, is 
profiled against the domain of FUELLING, which presupposes the domain matrix of 
SUBSTANCES AND CONTAINERS, as well as the domain of FUEL-REQUIRING 
MECHANICAL OBJECTS – see Figure 2.  
 
 
                                                 
§§ Note that here Croft seems to be contradicting his earlier remark in the same paper that 
taxonomically related concepts are profiled in the same domain. 
*** It is not claimed that this list is necessarily exhaustive (although it does appear to cover the logically 
possible ways). 
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Figure 2: The domain configurations of the taxonomically related meanings of fill up 
 
 This means that the domain against which the narrower, ‘make the fuel tank of 
a vehicle full of fuel’ meaning is profiled presupposes the domain against which the 
broader meaning is primarily profiled. The vertically related meanings of fill up do 
not, therefore, involve the kind of domain highlighting process we find in 
metonymies, where both the literal and the metonymically extended meanings are 
profiled against the same domain matrix, but the salience of particular domains is 
different in each case. 
 
3.3. Profiling in different domains, one an instance of another 
One case where the vertically related meanings of a lexical form are profiled against 
different taxonomically related domains is love. This lexical form has both a verbal 
and a nominal use, both of which are vertically polysemous in that they can either 
refer to strong affection or strong romantic affection.††† The broader meaning is 
profiled at least against the domain of HUMAN RELATIONS and also contains 
specifications in the domain of EMOTION. The narrower meaning, on the other hand, is 
profiled against a more specific instance of the HUMAN RELATIONS domain, ROMANTIC 
RELATIONS. This domain presupposes various domains, including SEXUALITY. We 
may assume that ROMANTIC RELATIONS constitutes a distinct domain from its 
superordinate domain HUMAN RELATIONS to the extent that the notion of romantic and 
sexual interpersonal relationships is humanly very significant. Also, such a domain 
would act as the base e.g. for the concepts of MARRIAGE, GIRLFRIEND/BOYFRIEND, 
DATING – cf. Croft (1993), who argues that a conceptual structure may be 
characterised as a domain to the extent that it acts as the base for at least one, but 
typically many concepts.  
                                                 
††† Love can have the vertically related meanings ‘strong affection’ and ‘strong romantic affection’ 
discussed here, but it is also possible to construe the meaning of love as two contrasting senses (or 
microsenses – see e.g. Cruse, 2002b) which are not vertically related: ‘romantic love’ and ‘non-
romantic love’. (The latter encompasses love between friends, siblings, parent and child – cf. the 
classical Greek notions philia and storge). These different meanings occur in different contexts – e.g. 
the broadest, hyperonymous meaning occurs in There are many people who love you – your boyfriend, 
your best friend, your parents and brothers.  
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 The domain configuration of the two vertically related meanings of love is 
therefore one where the broader ‘strong affection’ meaning is profiled against one 
domain, and the narrower ‘strong romantic affection’ meaning is profiled against a 
domain which is an instance of the domain that the broader meaning is profiled 
against. This is shown in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3: Simplified domain structures of the vertically related meanings of love. 
 
 The verb drink is another case where vertically related meanings can be seen 
as being profiled against different domains that are themselves taxonomically related. 
Drink is vertically polysemous in that it can refer either to the consumption of liquid 
in general (1) or more specifically to the consumption of alcohol (2):‡‡‡ 
 
(1) I drink a glass of orange juice every morning. 
(2) Sheila can’t drink – she’s allergic to alcohol. 
 
In Cognitive Grammar, verbs are inherently seen as profiling a relation, unlike 
nominal concepts that profile a thing (used in a technical sense of ‘a region in some 
domain’ [Langacker, 1987:189]). Furthermore, the relation profiled by a verbal 
concept is temporal in that the concept designates a process that inherently involves 
the notion of evolution through time. The profile of the verb drink includes the notion 
of the relation (i.e. the process or drinking) as well as schematic representations of the 
entities linked by the relation (i.e. the drinker and the drink), which, in Langacker’s 
terms are called trajector and landmark. The trajector is the more prominent one of 
the two profiled entities, and corresponds to the subject. The profile also includes 
references to other, more peripheral entities involved in the relation, such as the 
instrument, manner, purpose (etc.) of the drinking activity.  
 In the case of the broader meaning, the schematic trajector and landmark 
contain specifications of the kinds of entities that can occur as the drinker and the 
thing being drunk. The drinker has to be an animate being while the thing being drunk 
is specified as a liquid. In contrast, in the narrower meaning of drink the landmark 
role is filled by a richer specification of the liquid – as an alcoholic one. In addition, 
                                                 
‡‡‡ Drink also has a nominal use which is vertically polysemous in the same way, with the meanings ‘a 
beverage’ and ‘an alcoholic beverage’, but I will here focus on the verbal meaning. 
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the trajector role is specified as a human being in as much that the ‘consume alcohol’ 
meaning is generally thought of as a human activity. The broader and narrower 
meanings therefore differ in that the narrower meaning is specified more richly with 
respect to the profiled trajector and landmark roles. 
 Considering the domain structure presupposed by the senses of drink, the 
‘consume liquid’ sense makes reference at least to the domain of DRINKING, which is 
an instance of the CONSUMING domain, itself an instance of the ACTIVITY domain. The 
DRINKING domain also involves reference to LIQUIDS and ANIMATE BEINGS. The 
semantic structure of drink ‘consume alcohol’, on the other hand, is profiled against a 
different domain, that of ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION, which is an instance of the 
DRINKING domain. This domain is a culturally significant one, and it is presupposed 
by concepts such as PUB, BEER, WINE, DRUNK etc. As mentioned, alcohol consumption 
is something we usually think of as a human activity, and this is defined as part of the 
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION domain. This motivates the specification of the trajector of 
drink ‘consume alcohol’ as a human being. The narrower meaning of drink, of course, 
also makes reference to other cultural factors that we may associate with drinking 
alcohol (such as the knowledge of the effects on health of alcohol), and a more 
complete analysis of the semantic structure of the linguistic unit would also include 
the domains that such knowledge is characterised against. 
 In both the case of love and drink, the vertically related meanings are therefore 
profiled against domains which are themselves taxonomically related. This is clearly 
different from instances of metonymy which, as discussed, essentially involve 
meronomic domain configurations – shifts in the salience of two parts of the same 
domain matrix.  
 
3.4. Narrower meaning profiled against an additional domain 
One of the most frequently discussed examples of vertical polysemy is dog, which can 
either refer to ‘canine’ or, more specifically to ‘male canine’ in contrast with bitch. 
The meaning of dog is profiled in at least the domain LIVING THINGS§§§ According to 
Croft (1993), this domain for its part presupposes the domains LIFE and PHYSICAL 
OBJECTS. PHYSICAL OBJECTS is a domain matrix composed out of (at least) MATTER, 
LOCATION, SHAPE and SIZE. The last three are profiled against the basic domain of 
SPACE. There are, of course, a number of other domains involved in the 
characterisation of the meaning of dog, e.g. those that have to do with the role of 
canines in human society as pets or working dogs, domains relating to stereotypical 
characteristics of dogs (such as loyalty) and so on.  
 The more specific meaning of dog, ‘male canine’, profiles an additional 
property in the SEX domain. Sex constitutes a significant property of animals and to 
                                                 
§§§ Admittedly, this is a case where it is not clear whether the relationship between two concepts is 
taxonomic or presuppositional. Clearly, dogs are kinds of living things, but it also seems plausible that 
the concept of DOG presupposes the notion of living things. One reason in favour analysing DOG as 
being profiled against LIVING THINGS is that this account is consistent with the proposals in some 
psychological theories of concepts. For example, Murphy and Medin (1985) and Medin and Ortony 
(1989) have proposed that natural kind concepts are understood against folk models of what it means 
for a thing to be a living thing, including folk theories of life and genetics.  
 Note that Croft (1993) similarly points out the difficulties of determining whether one concept 
presupposes another or whether the two are taxonomically related. In his analysis of the domain 
structure for LETTER T, he argues that this concept indirectly presupposes the domain of WRITING which 
itself presupposes HUMAN COMMUNICATION. However, he notes that while writing could be seen as an 
activity that can only be understood relative to the domain of human communication, it could 
alternatively be seen as an instance of human communication.  
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the extent that to understand the notion of sex one needs to make reference to living 
organisms and their reproductive methods, we may say that this domain itself 
presupposes the domain of LIVING THINGS. There is therefore a similarity between the 
case of dog and that of fill up where there is also a presuppositional relationship 
between domains against which the broader and narrower meanings are profiled. 
However, there is a difference between the two cases. In the case of fill up, where the 
‘make the fuel tank of a vehicle full of fuel’ meaning is primarily profiled against a 
different domain from that of the broader, ‘make something full’ meaning. In contrast, 
the narrower meaning of dog is still primarily profiled against the domain of LIVING 
THINGS, but because the narrower meaning specifies the sex of the animal in question, 
this information is profiled against an additional domain, a domain which also 
presupposes the primary domain of the broader meaning. The domain structures 
involved in the vertically related meanings of dog are shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Simplified domain structures of the vertically related meanings of dog. 
 
It is also plausible that the ‘male canine’ meaning, which tends to be restricted to 
contexts such as dog breeding or dog shows would also make reference to domains 
that have to do with such specialised knowledge.  
 Another similar example is Finnish mies, which can either designate ‘man’ or 
more specifically ‘husband’. While the broader meaning is profiled against HUMAN 
BEING and SEX (among many other domains characterising the encyclopaedic 
knowledge we associate with men), the narrower ‘husband’ meaning makes reference 
to an additional domain, that of MARRIAGE. These cases where the narrower meaning 
of a vertical polyseme profiles properties in an additional domain again demonstrate 
the distinction between the domain structures involved in vertical polysemy and those 
involved in metonymy.   
 
3.5. Profiling different areas of the same domain(s) 
A large class of vertical polysemes appear to belong to the class where the vertically 
related meanings are distinguished from each other by the narrower meaning profiling 
 12
more richly defined specifications in a domain or domains that are also presupposed 
by the broader meaning. What this means is that the broader and narrower meanings 
profile more loosely or strictly defined areas of the same domain. The vertical 
polysemy of colour illustrates this. Colour can refer either only to chromatic colours 
excluding black and white (and the shades of grey in between) or it can include the 
achromatic colours as well. The meaning of colour is profiled against the domain 
COLOUR, which, according to Langacker (1987), is a basic domain. The broader 
meaning profiles the whole of the colour space, while the narrower meaning only 
profiles the region of the chromatic colour space, excluding black and white – see 
Figure 5. The region profiled by the narrower meaning is a salient sub-area of the 
COLOUR domain. The broader and narrower meanings therefore profile different areas 
of the same domain, areas that are in a relationship of inclusion.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: The domain structures of the broader and narrower senses of colour, showing the different 
areas of the COLOUR domain profiled by each of the senses. 
 
 Another example of the profiling of different regions by vertical polysemes is 
finger with its meanings ‘one of the hand digits’ and ‘one of the four hand digits 
exclusive of the thumb’. The meaning of finger is profiled against the domain HAND. 
The broader meaning profiles a more inclusive region of the domain than the 
narrower meaning, which excludes the thumb. We can see the motivation of the two 
vertically related meanings in the fact that within the HAND domain, there is a 
prominent, structural difference between the thumb and the other four hand digits.  
 A similar example to finger is cat, which in addition to its narrower meaning 
‘domestic cat’ has a more inclusive sense which covers all mammals of the genus 
Felis. Both of these meanings are profiled against the domain of LIVING THINGS, but 
the ‘Felis’ sense profiles less specific properties within the domain than the ‘domestic 
cat’ sense, which specifies e.g. the typical size and colourings of domestic cats.  
 In some cases where the broader and narrower meanings profile different areas 
of the same domains, the profiling distinctions can be rather complex and occur across 
multiple domains. Consider, for example, cup, which can be used as a general term 
for drinking vessels for hot liquids (as in [3]) or more specifically in contrast with 
mug (see [4]).  
 
(3) Mugs are kinds of cups. 
(4) To serve: Place 1 heaped tablespoon in a cup or mug.  
 [from instructions for making hot chocolate] 
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Cup designates an artefact concept, and we can assume that its meaning presupposes a 
domain which characterises the physical properties of the artefact and a domain 
characterising its function. We may also assume that the domains relating to the form 
and the function of artefacts interact with each other, to the extent that the intended 
function of an artefact can be seen as causally determining the physical appearance of 
the artefact in question (cf. e.g. Rips, 1989; Ahn, 1998). Thus the concept of CUP is 
profiled at least against the domain of PHYSICAL OBJECTS and a domain relating to the 
function of the entity in question, DRINKING HOT LIQUIDS. The DRINKING HOT LIQUIDS 
domain is a complex one and includes reference to the concepts CUP, SAUCER, MUG, 
POT, TEA, COFFEE etc. It also presupposes domains such as HEAT, WATER etc.  
 The broader and narrower meanings of cup profile different regions of both 
the PHYSICAL OBJECTS and DRINKING HOT LIQUIDS domains. The physical properties 
specified as part of the broader meaning are more schematic than those for the 
narrower meaning, and thus the broader meaning profiles a more inclusive area of the 
PHYSICAL OBJECTS domain than the narrower one. As for the domain of DRINKING HOT 
LIQUIDS, the narrower meaning profiles a less inclusive region of this domain, one 
which specifies the situation where the cup is used as a more formal or idealised one, 
where you would usually be sitting down and using saucers with the cups etc. (see 
Wierzbicka, 1985). The broader meaning, on the other hand, includes mugs as vessels 
for drinking hot liquids, and focuses less on the particular characteristics of the 
situation and therefore profiles a more schematic area of the DRINKING HOT LIQUIDS 
domain.  
 Another example somewhat similar to cup is rain, which generally designates 
condensed water vapour in the atmosphere that falls down in drops, but in some 
contexts can be used in contrast with drizzle, ‘fine rain’, to mean a more intense kind 
of rain. The specification of the nature of rain occurs across many domains: the 
meaning of rain is profiled against the domain of WEATHER, which presupposes 
domains such as OUTDOORS, SUN, WATER, TEMPERATURE etc. The narrower meaning 
profiles a less inclusive area of the domain of WEATHER, which characterises the 
downpour as more intense in its quality in contrast with DRIZZLE (which is also 
profiled against the domain of WEATHER). The motivation for the narrower sense 
which excludes drizzle lies in the fact that from a human perspective, drizzle feels 
very different from more intense rain and has less severe consequences for the kinds 
of activities one may do outdoors.  
 Cases where the broader and narrower meanings profile different areas of the 
same domain(s) resemble in some ways those cases where the vertically related 
meanings are profiled against domains that are themselves in a taxonomic relationship 
(such as love and drink discussed in 3.3 above). In the case of cup, for instance, the 
narrower meaning presupposes a more specific stereotypical tea/coffee-drinking 
scenario. Such a scenario essentially constitutes an instance of the general situations 
of drinking hot liquids. However, I argue that the more specific scenario does not 
constitute a separate, more specific domain in the same way as ROMANTIC RELATIONS 
is a separate domain from (and a more specific instance of) HUMAN RELATIONS. As 
discussed, the notion of romantic and sexual relationships is one that is culturally and 
humanly very significant, and one that is also presupposed by a number of other 
concepts apart from LOVE. In contrast, the idea of stereotypical tea/coffee drinking 
situations has far less cultural importance, and for this reason, I do not view it as a 
separate domain but rather as a salient sub-area of the domain of DRINKING HOT 
LIQUIDS. We may, however, assume that the distinctness of particular conceptual 
domains is not absolute, but rather a matter of degree. Particular sub-areas of domains 
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may thus vary in their salience and distinctness. This view is consistent with a remark 
made by Langacker (1987:152), who views the distinction between domains and 
semantic dimensions within domains as something that is in many cases made on an 
arbitrary basis. 
 In summary, then, I have shown above that there are different ways in which 
the taxonomic relationship between the senses in vertical polysemy may be effected. 
In all cases the narrower meaning in some way profiles more richly defined 
properties. In some cases the narrower meaning presupposes a more richly defined 
domain than the broader meaning (one which is either presuppositionally or 
taxonomically related to a domain presupposed by the broader meaning.) In other 
cases the narrower meaning presupposes an additional domain, and in yet others it 
profiles more specific properties within the domain(s) presupposed by the broader 
meaning. This means that vertical polysemes do not involve the kind of domain 
structures as we find in metonymies. 
 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
In the above I have discussed examples of vertical polysemy from the perspective of 
Langackerian domain-based encyclopaedic semantics in order to compare the domain 
structures involved in vertical polysemy and metonymy. I concluded that while 
metonymy involves an essentially meronomic domain configuration (a shift within the 
parts of the domain matrix), the domain structures involved in vertical polysemy 
essentially encapsulate a taxonomic relationship where the narrower meaning is more 
richly defined than the broader one. Thus I have argued that vertical polysemy should 
not be treated simply as a type of metonymic relation. However, one of the questions 
we may ask is whether there are any metonymic-type processes involved in vertical 
polysemy. As mentioned, Croft (1993) argues that metonymy always involves a 
process of domain highlighting. But he also argues that domain highlighting also 
operates in other semantic processes that, he maintains, are not instances of 
metonymy proper. Croft proposes that while in many cases of meaning shifts some 
specific aspect of a given semantic structure is highlighted, such cases only amount to 
metonymy if this conceptual highlighting is accompanied by a shift of reference to a 
different entity. Thus the fact that book can either refer to a physical tome or the 
textual contents does not constitute a metonymy, although it does involve a 
metonymic-type conceptual highlighting process.**** A very similar idea is put 
forward by Paradis (2004) who also argues that there is a gradation of metonymic-
type processes, ranging from fully-fledged metonymies which involve a relationship 
between two different concepts to active zone phenomena, which just involve the 
highlighting of a part of a concept, as in, e.g. I need to sharpen my pencil, where the 
entity that needs to be sharpened is in fact only the tip of the pencil. 
 Cases like the facet-alternation of book and the active zone highlighting of 
pencil thus involve the highlighting and backgrounding of certain conceptual parts, 
and the consequent shifting of reference to a part of the concept in question. In 
contrast, the development of vertical polysemy involves the shifting of reference to a 
different (broader or narrower) category. But it is conceivable that the processes of 
highlighting particular properties and backgrounding others are also involved in the 
vertical polysemy. Broadening of sense draws attention to some characteristics of the 
                                                 
**** This is consistent with a proposal by Cruse (e.g. 2000a, 2002b), who argues that meaning of book 
has two facets, TEXT and TOME, which constitute less than fully distinct sense units. 
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category while ignoring others (see Barcelona, 2004). Similarly, we can find 
highlighting of characteristics in cases where vertical polysemy emerges through 
narrowing to contrast with another lexical item, as in the case of cup, where the 
narrower sense of cup contrasts with mug. In such cases the narrowed sense is defined 
by highlighting the properties that effect the contrast with the other lexical item. 
Therefore conceptual highlighting and backgrounding processes which are similar to 
those involved in metonymy, but do not amount to metonymy proper, are of vital 
importance in the flexibility of meaning in general, including the development of 
vertical polysemy. But the subtlety of such processes may be lost if vertical polysemy 
is simply considered a subtype of metonymy.  
 In conclusion, the examination presented in this paper makes two kinds of 
contributions to the study of meaning from a cognitive viewpoint: firstly, examining 
the domain structures involved in vertical polysemy provides an account of 
taxonomically related concepts within encyclopaedic semantics. Such an account has 
not previously been presented, to my knowledge, although the analysis of the vertical 
polysemes here combines some of the insights of previous work on semantic 
structures in encyclopaedic, domain-based semantics. But in addition to this, this 
examination also contributes to the study of metonymy. By recognising that vertical 
polysemy is not straightforwardly a type of metonymy, we can provide more 
sophisticated analyses of the nature of metonymy as well as of the cognitive processes 
and conceptual structures involved in categorial shift, sense broadening and 
narrowing and vertical polysemy.   
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